THE UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICE OF HIRING
ILLEGAL ALIEN WORKERS
Kevin S. Marshall*
Businesses or employers that knowingly hire illegal aliens are
violating the law, but who is there to enforce such laws? The
federal government is overwhelmed. In the case of those
businesses that gain an unfair advantage by hiring illegal aliens
for below-market wages, often without paying taxes, perhaps it is
time we gave their direct competitors the ability to sue for unfair
competition. This would allow those businesses put at a
competitive disadvantage to punish the cheaters. These very
competitors justly complain the loudest to me about illegal
immigration. The law-abiding businesses of Virginia are at a
disadvantage when competing with businesses defying our laws
by hiring illegal aliens.
- Virginia State Senator Ken Cuccinelli 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

The issue of whether hiring illegal workers constitutes an unfair
method of competition is presently emerging from an embryonic stage of
hypothetical consideration to a potentially viable jurisprudential issue. 2
* Kevin S. Marshall is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of La
Verne College of Law, Ontario, California. Professor Marshall received a B.A. in
economics from Knox College, Galesburg, Illinois in 1982, a J.D. from Emory
University School of Law in 1985, a Masters in Public Affairs from the University
of Texas at Dallas in 1991, and a Ph.D. in political economy from the University of
Texas at Dallas in 1993. Professor Marshall teaches courses in antitrust, law and
economics, remedies, and contracts at the University’s College of Law, as well as
graduate courses in economics and finance at the University of La Verne College
of Business and Public Management. This article received the Pacific Southwest
Academy of Legal Studies in Business’ 2008 Double-Blind Peer-Reviewed Best
Paper Award.
1. Ken Cuccinelli (Va. State Senator for the 37th District of Va.), What Should
Virginia Do About Illegal Immigrants? RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 6, 2005, at F1.
2. See Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Complaint and Defendant’s
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Although identified, acknowledged and even advocated within the current
debate regarding immigration reform, 3 the issue has been essentially
ignored within the jurisprudential landscape of domestic competition law.
This article addresses the viability of an unfair competition claim grounded
on the act of hiring illegal workers from an economic perspective.
This article’s analysis proceeds in five parts. Part I serves as an
overview.
Part II introduces and descriptively analyzes the
jurisprudential/economic issue in question, as well as chronicles recently
filed inter-competitor lawsuits seeking relief from the illegal hiring
practices of a horizontal competitor. Part II also demonstrates that the
issues addressed herein are timely and relevant with respect to the current
socio-economic debate regarding U.S. immigration policy.
Part III reviews the economic objectives of the antitrust laws, and
supplements and bolsters the reader’s understanding of the interdisciplinary
relationship between law and economics within the context of antitrust law
and the regulation of competition. In this regard, Part III introduces and
explains the fundamental microeconomic constructs that drive the
efficiencies of the perfectly-competitive model. Part III further argues that
a robust understanding of the fundamental economic tenets of the perfectlycompetitive economic model is a necessary predicate to understanding
actionable anticompetitive behavior. More importantly, Part III describes
Counterclaims, at 27, Seven Lives, Inc. v. Regal Baking Co., No. CV 00-08851 CBM (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 15, 2000) [hereinafter Answer], wherein defendant competitor alleges that
“[u]pon information and belief Counter-Defendants employ a substantial number of illegal
aliens in its business operations, probably the majority of their employees, which gives the
Counter-Defendants an unfair business advantage over legitimate competitors like CounterPlaintiff.”; see also Complaint at 7, Global Horizons, Inc. v. Munger Bros., LLC, No. S1500-CV 258904 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 21, 2006), wherein the plaintiff, Global Horizons,
Inc., alleges that the Defendants “conspired to restrain trade or commerce and lessen
competition by Defendants’ use of illegal immigrant labor and violation of California wage
and hour laws to those workers, the effect of which restrains and directly affects Plaintiff’s
ability to compete in the marketplace.” Global Horizons further alleges that the Defendants
“illegally conspired to have illegal immigrant undocumented workers used as cheap farm
labor on defendant MUNGER’S commercial farm from April thru June 2006.” Id. at 8.
The Complaint also states that “[i]f Defendant’s prohibited combination is allowed to
continue unabated . . . [c]ompetition in the field of commercial farm labor in Kern County
will be eliminated or substantially lessened.” Id. at 9.
3. See Cuccinelli, supra note 1, at F1 (advocating for the right to sue businesses that
hire illegal immigrants); see also, e.g., Sylvia R. Lazos, The Professor's Corner: In the
Most Important Immigration Case in Recent History, the U.S. Government and
Undocumented Workers Lose, NEVADA LAWYER (June 2003), available at
http://www.nvbar.org/publications/NevadaLawyer/2003/June2003/
ImmigrationLaw.htm (“Unlike other business rules, benefiting from hiring undocumented
labor is not per se illegal. In the law of unfair competition, for example, the very act of
price fixing is illegal and actionable under law. The same goes for polluting. In
immigration law, employers are not held to any legal consequence if they are found to be
employing undocumented workers.”).
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and illustrates the analytical relevance of the perfectly-competitive model’s
conditions of (a) profit maximization and (b) zero, long-run economic
profits, both of which provide significant insight with respect to the task of
identifying predatory conduct.
Part IV, applying the microeconomic constructs discussed in Part III,
analyzes the economics of hiring illegal alien workers at below-market
wages. Generally, Part IV identifies and analyzes the injury to the
competitive marketplace that results from a horizontal competitor’s act of
hiring illegal workers. Specifically, Part IV (a) identifies the economic
externalities and market distortions associated with the illegal act; (b)
analyzes the act within the context of the perfectly-competitive model’s
assumption of certeris parabis; and (c) addresses when, if ever, the illegal
activity constitutes an act of predation generating a horizontal competitive
advantage.
Part V examines and discusses relevant jurisprudential economic and
antitrust precedent with respect to the (anti)competitive conduct in
question. Part V indicates that the act of hiring illegal alien workers at
below-market wages triggers potential liability under Sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Antitrust Act, and also constitutes an unfair trade practice
under both state and federal laws. Part V specifically references the
relevance of the California Unfair Competition Law given that it broadly
proscribes any “unlawful business act” as constituting an unfair
competitive practice. The California statutory model is specifically
relevant to this article’s discussion regarding the importance of the ceteris
paribus condition of perfect competition.
Finally, Part VI concludes by asserting that the conduct of hiring
illegal workers may indeed constitute an unlawful restraint of trade and/or
unfair trade practice under both state and federal law. It posits, however,
that unambiguous enforcement policies within either regulatory regimes of
trade or immigration will correct and/or minimize the accompanying
economic distortions and inefficiencies resulting from such practices.
II.

GAINING UNFAIR COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES BY HIRING ILLEGAL
ALIENS AND PAYING BELOW-MARKET WAGES

A.

A Statement of the Problem.

The United States’ Immigration and Naturalization Act states that it is
unlawful for an employer to knowingly hire an unauthorized alien worker. 4
4. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 274A(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)
(2000) states that
In general, it is unlawful for a person or other entity—(A) to hire, or to recruit
or refer a fee, for employment in the United States an alien knowing the alien is
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Although the title of this article specifies the unfair trade practice of hiring
illegal workers, it is somewhat of a misnomer. The mere act of hiring an
illegal worker does not necessarily translate into an unfair trade practice.
Nevertheless, if such an act creates a market-distorting, horizontal
competitive advantage for the hiring firm, then the illegal act may
potentially constitute an unfair trade practice. The illegality of hiring a
non-resident, alien worker is inconsequential, unless it can be demonstrated
that the illegality of the transaction led to a below-market wage with
horizontal, anticompetitive effects. Although the illegal nature of the act
may be relevant with respect to an issue of intent or the reasonableness of
the act, the more important issue seems to focus on whether the unlawful
hiring practice creates a competitive advantage that is ultimately injurious
to competition.
B.

Recent Allegations and Case Scenarios—Dancing Around the Issue.

In recent years there have been several cases asserting allegations of
competitive and/or commercial advantages arising from a defendant’s act
of hiring illegal alien workers. 5 Although such allegations implicate both
state and federal antitrust laws, they have seldom been asserted for the
purpose of seeking direct relief under such laws; and if they did directly
reference either a state or federal antitrust law, such allegations have yet to
be decided on the merits of such anticompetitive claims.
For example, in Larez v. Oberti 6 the class action plaintiffs alleged
that:
[D]efendants willfully and knowingly and in violation of the
federal Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S. C. 1101 et. seq.)
induced persons to enter the United States in violation of that act,
concealed, harbored and sheltered the illegal aliens from
detection and employed such illegal workers at lower wages in
competition with domestic workers. It is stated that at least 20
an unauthorized alien . . . with respect to such employment, or (B)(i) to hire for
employment in the United States an individual without complying with the
requirements of subsection (b) of this section or (ii) if the person or entity is an
agricultural association, agricultural employer, or farm labor contractor (as
defined in section 1802 of title 29), to hire, or to recruit or refer for a fee, for
employment in the United States an individual without complying with the
requirements of subsection (b) of this section.
5. See United States v. Tyson Foods, 258 F. Supp. 2d. 809 (E.D. Tenn. 2003)
(involving defendant’s use of illegal immigrant labor to gain a business advantage); Answer,
supra note 2 at 27 (alleging that the use of illegal aliens as a majority of the employees gave
the Counter-Defendants “an unfair business advantage over legitimate competitors . . . .”);
see also Complaint, supra note 2 (alleging that defendant’s use of illegal labor for below
market wages conferred upon defendant an unfair competitive advantage).
6. Larez v. Oberti, 23 Cal. App. 3d 217 (Ct. App. 1972).
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percent of the work force in the areas mentioned consists of such
workers, which has resulted in the depression of domestic farm
workers’ wages and working conditions, the creation of excessive
unemployment among farm workers and farm workers being
unnecessarily dependent upon welfare. 7
One of the primary grounds upon which the injunctive relief was
sought by the Larez class-plaintiffs was that the “defendants’ conduct
amount[ed] to unfair and unlawful competition.” 8 The California court,
however, refrained from granting the requested injunctive relief citing
several equitable reasons in addition to holding that the enforcement of
immigration policy was essentially a federal issue. 9
Seven Lives, Inc. v. Regal Baking Co. 10 involved “a trade dress dispute
over [the use and ownership of] common cookie designs,” between two
competing bakeries. 11 The Defendant filed a counterclaim alleging:
[C]ounter-Defendants employ[ed] a substantial number of illegal
aliens in its business operations, probably the majority of their
employees, which [gave] the Counter-Defendants an unfair
business advantage over legitimate competitors, like CounterPlaintiff. 12
[C]ounter-Defendants maintain[ed] two sets of records with
which to track employee time to avoid paying employees at the
legally mandated overtime rates. The Counter-Defendants [had] .
. . their employees punch out after working 40 hours in any week
and then [kept] track of the over time on separate records and
either [paid] the employee “under the table” or under a different
social security number to avoid paying overtime rates. This
alleged practice [gave] the Counter-Defendants an unfair
7. Id. at 220.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 222 (“The federal government could, if it would, reduce the flow of illegal
entrants to a trickle or virtually dry it up. Rationalization of social security procedures
would impede if not bar their access to the employment market. A paradox of this lawsuit is
plaintiff’s discerned need for a decree compelling inquiry by California farm operators when
an agency of the federal government—supplied with an apparatus of offices, staff and
computerized equipment—is unwilling or unable to conduct that inquiry. . . . It is more
orderly, more effectual, less burdensome to the affected interests, that the national
government redeem its commitment. Thus the court of equity withholds its aid.” (citing
Cobos v. Mello-dy Ranch, 20 Cal. App. 3d 947, 950 (1971) as support)).
10. No. 00-CV08851 CBM (C.D. Cal. 2000); see supra text accompanying notes 2 and
5.
11. Regal Baking Company Challenges Monaco Baking Company Over Common
Cookie Designs in Trade Dress Dispute and Seeks $5 Million in Damages, BUSINESS WIRE,
Oct.
2,
2000,
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0EIN/is_2000_Oct_2/ai_65637691?tag=content;col1
(last visited Oct. 13, 2008) [hereinafter Trade Dress Dispute].
12. Answer, supra note 2, at 27; see also Trade Dress Dispute, supra note 11 (quoting
same from Defendant’s Answer).
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business advantage over legitimate competitors, like CounterPlaintiff. 13
The dispute was ultimately resolved by an agreement regulating the
parties’ rights with respect to the cookie designs in question. 14
Consequently, the Defendant’s counterclaims (colored with allegations of
unfair competition) stalled and were never reached on their merits.
In United States v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 15 the United States brought
criminal charges alleging that “the defendants, aided and abetted by each
other and by other persons, did knowingly bring to and cause to be brought
to the United States certain illegal aliens for the purpose of commercial
advantage and private financial gain.” 16
Although a Chattanooga
Tennessee jury ultimately acquitted the defendants of conspiracy to hire
illegal immigrants, it nonetheless was reported that:
[In 2002], Tyson Foods’ CEO made $3.43 million; according to
the U.S. Government, Tyson Foods also hired thousands of
undocumented workers who fueled the profits that made such
rich rewards possible. Jobs in chicken processing plants, because
of harsh working conditions, yield annual turnover close to 100
percent . . . . Managers were under pressure to produce profits
and fill low wage jobs as best they can. While foreigners and
those who did not speak English appeared to dominate local
plants—something that should have raised red flags regarding the
company’s compliance with immigration laws—local plant
managers chose instead to concentrate on the bottom profit line.
Such incentives fuel a voracious market for low wage illegal
labor. 17
Tyson Foods involved a criminal prosecution alleging various but
specific violations of the United States’ immigration laws. 18 Although the
13. Answer, supra note 2, at 27; see also Trade Dress Dispute, supra note 11 (quoting
same from Defendant’s Answer).
14. See Trade Dress Dispute, supra note 11 (discussing terms of a modified temporary
restraining order as agreed upon by the parties).
15. 258 F. Supp. 2d. 809 (E.D. Tenn. 2003).
16. Id. at 819.
17. Lazos, supra note 3.
18. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A) (2005) states that
Any person who—(i) knowing that a person is an alien, brings to or attempts to
bring to the United States in any manner whatsoever such person at a place
other than a designated port of entry or place other than as designated by the
Commissioner, regardless of whether such alien has received prior official
authorization to come to, enter, or reside in the United States and regardless of
any future official action which may be taken with respect to such alien; (ii)
knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered,
or remains in the United States in violation of law, transports, or moves or
attempts to transport or move such alien within the United States by means of
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facts also implicated potential antitrust liability and unfair acts of
competition, the government failed to seek any direct relief under either
state or federal antitrust or unfair competition laws.
In Williams v. Mohawk Industries, Inc., 19 “[t]he plaintiffs filed [a]
class-action complaint alleging that [Defendant’s] widespread and knowing
employment and harboring of illegal workers allowed [Defendant] to
reduce labor costs by depressing wages for its legal hourly employees and
discourag[ing] worker’s-compensation claims, in violation of federal and
state RICO statutes.” 20 Again, the plaintiffs’ allegations were not grounded
on state or federal antitrust or unfair competition laws, but rather were
grounded upon state and federal RICO statutes. It is interesting to note that
the Eleventh Circuit ultimately affirmed (in part) that the class plaintiffs
sufficiently alleged claims under both state and federal RICO statutes. 21
C.

Allegations of Unfair Trade Practices, Restraints of Trade and
Attempts to Monopolize.

In 2006, the pleadings filed in Global Horizons, Inc. v. Munger
Bros. 22 finally implicated state antitrust laws by direct reference.
Specifically, it was alleged that:
[Defendants] illegally conspired to have illegal immigrant
undocumented workers used as cheap farm labor . . . . 23
Defendants . . . and others entered into and engaged in an
unlawful trust in restraint of trade and commerce and [sic] which
prevents or lessens competition . . . . 24
transportation or otherwise, in furtherance of such violation of law; (iii)
knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered,
or remains in the United States in violation of law, conceals, harbors, or shields
from detection, or attempts to conceal, harbor, or shield from detection, such
alien in any place, including any building or any means of transportation; (iv)
encourages or induces an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the United States,
knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such coming to, entry, or
residence is or will be in violation of law; or (v)(I) engages in any conspiracy to
commit any of the preceding acts, or (II) aids or abets the commission of any of
the preceding acts, shall be punished as provided in subparagraph (B).
19. 411 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2005), vacated, 126 S. Ct. 2016, remanded to 465 F.3d
1277 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1381 (2007).
20. Id. at 1255.
21. See Williams, 465 F.3d at 1282-95 (concluding that plaintiffs’ allegations were
sufficient under state and federal RICO statutes and thus the District Court properly denied
defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion on those claims).
22. See Complaint, supra note 2.
23. Id. at 8.
24. Id.
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Entry of new competitors or expansion of the market will not be .
. . likely, or sufficient to undo the competitive harm that has
resulted and will continue to result from Defendants [sic] . . .
attempt to monopolize the supply of commercial farm laborers
and involvement in the prohibited combination . . . in violation of
the Cartwright Act, as it was intended to prevent competition in
the commercial farm laborer industry. 25
There are high barriers to entry or expansion in the market for
commercial farm laborers. The barriers include providing
qualified farm laborers in a manner that is in compliance with
California State wage and hour laws and Federal immigration and
work visa laws. 26
Plaintiff . . . as part of its compliance with the H-2A worker visa
program incurs the expense of arranging transportation of the non
local workers from and back to their country of origin. [Plaintiff]
provides satisfactory housing for all of the non-local workers for
the entire time they are in this country. [Plaintiff] pays the
applicable processing fees to both the Departments of Labor and
Immigration. [Plaintiff] manages the laborers’ daily living
requirements and ensure [sic] that both the housing and job sites
pass frequent inspections by the applicable agency overseeing
[Plaintiff’s] treatment of farm laborers. 27
Labor suppliers such as Defendants do not have to incur the cost
of providing for any of the above expenses . . . . 28
If Defendant’s prohibited combination is allowed to continue

25. Id.
26. Id. at 9.
27. Id. It merits noting that an employer of an H-2A Visa Holder must incur significant
increased expenses with respect to the employment of such temporary workers. For
example, employers must pay the higher of the Adverse Effect Wage Rate (AEWR), the
applicable prevailing wage, or the statutory minimum wage as specified in the regulations.
See 20 C.F.R. § 655.107 (2008) (establishing that the higher wage rate must prevail). As of
October 7, 2008, the average AEWR reported by the Department of Labor, Employment and
Training Administration equals $9.43, a rate significantly higher than all reported state and
federal minimum wage laws. See 70 Fed. Reg. 10,288, 10,289 (Feb. 26, 2008) (containing
table establishing Adverse Effect Wage Rates for each state in 2008). Additionally,
employers must provide free housing to all temporary workers who are not reasonably able
to return to their residences on the same day subject to mandatory inspections according to
appropriate standards; provide either three meals a day to each visa holder or furnish free
and convenient cooking and kitchen facilities for workers to prepare their own meals; and
they must reimburse the cost of transportation and subsistence from the place of recruitment
to the place of work upon the workers completion of 50% of the work contract period.
Consequently, the economic advantages gained from hiring illegal alien workers at belowmarket (or statutory) wage rates is exacerbated when such workers are in direct competition
with H-2A Visa Holders. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(1)-(14) (2008) (discussing minimum
benefits, wages, and working conditions that must accompany all job offers for H-2A
applications).
28. Complaint, supra note 2, at 9.
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unabated . . . [c]ompetition in the field of commercial farm labor
in Kern County will be eliminated or substantially lessened. 29
Unlike the previously mentioned cases, Global Horizons included
specific allegations directly seeking relief available under California’s
antitrust statute (the Cartwright Act). 30 Although Global Horizons is in its
incipiency and has yet to be decided on the merits, it illustrates that the
issue of whether the unlawful hiring of illegal alien workers may constitute
an unreasonable restraint of trade and/or unfair trade practice under state
and/or federal antitrust laws is ripe for discussion and analysis.
Each of the above referenced cases (either indirectly or directly)
echoed claims of unfair competition, unfair business practices,
combinations in restraint of trade, and attempts to monopolize. All of these
claims, either in isolation or in the aggregate, are likely to substantially
lessen, if not eliminate, competition in the market place. As such claims
begin to resonate among practitioners, jurists and academics alike, the issue
of whether the unlawful hiring of illegal alien workers at below-market
wage rates invites an interdisciplinary analysis of such claims from both
economic and jurisprudential perspectives. This article begins such an
interdisciplinary analysis by first addressing the economics of antitrust
policy.
III. THE ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS
A.

The Preservation of Competition.

Federal antitrust law dictates that it is unlawful to engage in conduct
that “restrain[s]” or constitutes an “attempt to monopolize” or that
“monopolize[s]” trade or commerce. 31 The Federal Trade Commission
Act further provides that it is unlawful to engage in conduct that constitutes
“unfair methods of competition.” 32 Most states, if not all, prohibit similar
anticompetitive conduct and/or unfair methods of competition, 33 while
giving “varying degrees of deference to federal precedent in applying state
antitrust law to practices also subject to challenge under federal law.” 34
29. Id. at 9.
30. See Complaint, supra note 2, at 3 (“This complaint is filed and this action is
instituted under the Cartwright Act . . . for an unlawful trust, agreement, understanding, and
concert of action.”).
31. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2004) (emphasis added).
32. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006) (emphasis added).
33. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, 1 STATE ANTITRUST PRACTICES AND
STATUTES 1:22 (3d ed. 2004) (“Today, virtually every state has an antitrust statute of one
sort or another, as do the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands.”).
34. Id. at 1:22-23; see also ABA ANTITRUST SECTION: MONOGRAPH NO. 15, ANTITRUST
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The central purpose of both state and federal antitrust legislation is “to
preserve competition in those markets where competitive policy has not
been displaced by direct governmental regulation or exemption.” 35 Thus,
the study of antitrust law necessarily involves the study of competition:
“[i]t is a body of law that seeks to assure competitive markets through the
interaction of sellers and buyers in the dynamic process of exchange.” 36
Although the legislative history of the Sherman Act reveals multiple goals
and values expressed by its proponents, 37 the antitrust laws are
contemporarily understood as having been “written foremost to encourage
competition.” 38 It is, accordingly, of little surprise that “[e]conomists
generally view antitrust as a set of laws designed to promote competition,
and therefore, economic efficiency.” 39

FEDERALISM: THE ROLE OF STATE LAW (1988) (discussing the tension between federal and
state enforcement of the same substantive antitrust law principals).
35. PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & JOHN L. SOLOW, 2B ANTITRUST LAW,
AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION, 3-4 (3d ed. 2007).
36. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 1 (4th ed. 2003).
37. For example, “[t]he Congress that passed the Sherman Act was concerned with
business concentration, acquisition of monopoly power, cartels,” “[e]ntrepreneurial
independence,” dispersion of “economic power,” stimulation of “access to free markets,”
and protection of (a) “consumers from a redistribution of wealth from consumers to
monopolists,” and (b) “competitors from predatory practices.” Id. at 3 (citing S.1 51st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1889), reprinted in THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 89 (E. Kintner ed. 1978), 21 Cong. Rec. 2460, 2457, 3146,
3152 (1890)); see also STEPHEN ROSS, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW 6-11 (1993) (noting
that the goals of the Sherman Act included protection of small businesses and dispersion of
economic power); Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM.
L. REV. 377 (1965) (rebutting allegations that the Sherman and Clayton Acts are being
enforced in a way that is anticompetitive rather than preserving competition and protecting
customers); John J. Flynn, Antitrust Jurisprudence: A Symposium on the Economic,
Political and Social Goals of Antitrust Policy, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1182 (1977) (observing
that the motivations behind antitrust are obscure); Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of
Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140 (1981) (examining the contention
that antitrust laws should be used solely to promote economic efficiency); Robert H. Lande,
Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency
Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 67, 68, 70 (1982) (stating that there is
continued debate over Congress’ intentions when passing antitrust legislation); Louis B.
Schwartz, “Justice” and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076
(1979) (stating that one congressional goal of passing antitrust legislation was to remedy
unjust discrimination); E. Thomas Sullivan, The Economic Jurisprudence of the Burger
Court’s Antitrust Policy: The First Thirteen Years, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1982)
(stating that the Burger Court adopted a competition efficiency paradigm in its approach to
antitrust law).
38. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 36, at 4.
39. W. KIP VISCUSI, JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR. & JOHN M. VERNON, ECONOMICS OF
REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 70 (4th ed. 2005).
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The Objective of Perfect Competition—Efficiency.

Economic theory has long acknowledged that the given environment
within which society functions is constrained by scarcity, and that such
scarcity is the fundamental source of social and political conflict. 40 Given
such scarcity, all societies are confronted with the problem of determining
(1) “[w]hat, and how much, to produce,” (2) “[h]ow to produce it,” and (3)
The field of microeconomics has
“[f]or whom to produce it.” 41
demonstrated that the adoption of the perfectly-competitive model provides
a remarkable social mechanism with which to administer the social
problems generated by scarcity.
The perfectly-competitive model
ultimately nurtures, if not ensures, efficiencies in the allocation, production
and distribution of scarce resources. 42 As Figure 1 demonstrates, the
unfettered forces of supply and demand determine an efficient quantity of
production for any given good or service (Qe), as well as a market clearing
price with respect to that good or service (Pe); 43 it is at this point that the
market achieves equilibrium.

40. See DAVID C. COLANDER, MICROECONOMICS 5 (5th ed. 2004) (discussing how
scarcity and the unwillingness of individuals to solve the problem lead to basic economic
problems).
41. Id.
42. See AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, supra note 35, at 5 (“A perfectly competitive
economy produces an equilibrium that yields efficient use of resources in both the
productive and allocative senses. Productive efficiency means that firms maximize
operating efficiency by producing all goods and services at least cost. Allocative efficiency
entails that resources are allocated among the production of various goods and services so
that no reallocation of inputs and outputs could increase the aggregate consumer welfare by
making some consumers better off without making others worse off.”).
43. See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 23-24 (5th ed.
2001) (“The two curves intersect at the equilibrium, or market-clearing price and quantity.
At this price [Pe], the quantity supplied and the quantity demanded are just equal (to Qe).
The market mechanism is the tendency in a free market for the price to change until the
market clears—i.e., until the quantity supplied and the quantity demanded are equal. At this
point because there is neither excess demand nor excess supply, there is no pressure for the
price to change further. Supply and demand might not always be in equilibrium, and some
markets might not clear quickly when conditions change suddenly. The tendency is for
markets to clear.”).
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Figure 1 illustrates the market demand and supply curves for a given
good in a competitive market. The firm’s individual supply curve is
derived from its marginal cost curve, 44 that is, as long as the market price
for a given good equals or exceeds the marginal cost to produce that good,
a firm will produce and supply a given good. 45 The market or industry
supply curve is derived from the horizontal summation of all the marginalcost curves of the competing individual firms (i.e., the horizontal
THE UNFETTERED FORCES OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND:
Figure 1:

P
Supply = ∑ MC
P´
Pe
P´´
Demand

Q
Q

´

Qe

Q

´´

summation of their individual firm supply curves). 46

The industry or

44. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 125-26 (18th ed.
2005) (“Marginal cost is one the most important concepts in all of economics. Marginal
cost (MC) denotes the extra or additional cost of producing 1 extra unit of output.”); see
also infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
45. See COLANDER, supra note 40, at 247 (“Since the marginal cost curve tells the firm
how much to produce, the marginal cost curve is the perfectly competitive firm’s supply
curve.”); PINDYCK & RUBINFELD supra note 43, at 263 (“[T]he firm’s supply curve is the
portion of its marginal cost curve that lies above the average economic cost curve.”);
VISCUSI, HARRINGTON, JR. & VERNON, supra note 39, at 80 (“The individual firms’ supply
curves are their marginal cost curves; hence we can think of the supply curve [above] as the
industry’s marginal cost curve.”); see also infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
46. See COLANDER, supra note 40, at 254 (“In the short run when the number of firms
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market supply curve reflects the schedule of prices at which firms are
willing to supply a given quantity of any good or service. As price
increases, rational firms are willing to supply more and more, and thus the
more the market or industry is willing to supply. Given the positive
relationship between the price of a good or service and the quantity
supplied, the slope of the market or industry supply curve is also positive. 47
The industry or market demand curve “can be viewed as a schedule of
the marginal willingness-to-pay of customers.” 48 In Figure 1 above, the
competitive equilibrium price (Pe) equals the industry’s marginal cost of
production at the equilibrium output Qe. 49 Should the market only produce
Q´ units of the good or service in question, economic waste results because
the marginal willingness-to-pay exceeds the marginal cost to produce
additional units of the good or service. Should the market produce Q´´
units of the good or service in question, economic waste results because the
marginal cost to produce Q´´ units exceeds the marginal willingness-to-pay.
Figure 1 ultimately demonstrates that the unfettered forces of supply and
demand in a perfectly competitive market determines a market clearing
quantity (Qe) and a corresponding price (Pe), thereby answering the
profound political/economic question of what and how much society
should produce of a given good or service given the constraints of scarcity.
In equilibrium[,] price will equal marginal cost for all goods and
services, and rates of return (adjusted for risk) on investment in
the various markets will be equal and just sufficient to maintain
investment at current levels. Since each price reflects the value
of each product to the marginal buyer, and since each price
equals the cost of the marginal unit of output, consumer welfare
is maximized; any rearrangement of inputs and outputs can only

in the market is fixed, the market supply curve is just the horizontal sum of all the firms’
marginal cost curves, taking account of any changes in input prices that might occur.”);
PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 267 (“The short-run industry supply curve is the
summation of the supply curves of the individual firms.”); VISCUSI, HARRINGTON, JR. &
VERNON, supra note 39, at 80 (“The competitive industry’s supply curve is found by
horizontal aggregation of the supply curves of individual firms.”); see also infra note 83 and
accompanying text.
47. See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 44, at 51 (“One important reason for the
upward slope is ‘the law of diminishing returns’ . . . . Wine will illustrate this important
law. If society wants more wine, then additional labor will have to be added to the limited
land sites suitable for producing wine grapes. Each new worker will be adding less and less
extra product. The price needed to coax out additional wine output is therefore higher. By
raising the price of wine, society can persuade wine producers to produce and sell more
wine; the supply curve for wine is therefore upward-sloping.”).
48. VISCUSI, HARRINGTON, JR. & VERNON, supra note 39, at 81 (footnote omitted).
49. See id. (“[A]t the competitive equilibrium (price P*, output Q*), the marginal
willingness-to-pay P* exactly equals marginal cost at the output Q*.”).
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decrease the aggregate value of what consumers receive. 50
Thus, perfect competition minimizes waste by minimizing the risk of
under- or over-production. As a result, supply equals demand, and
resources are allocated and distributed to those who value them most.
C.

The Operational Conditions of Perfect Competition.

The underlying assumptions (or rather, the antecedent conditions) of
the perfectly-competitive model 51 essentially consist of the following:
1. The existence of numerous buyers and sellers, 52 each acting
independently 53 and rationally; 54
2. Each buyer and seller consumes or produces such a negligible
amount of the total output such that no one buyer or seller can
influence price by the amount he either consumes or produces; 55
50. See AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, supra note 35, at 6.
51. See COLANDER, supra note 40, at 242 (outlining the “[n]ecessary [c]onditions for
[p]erfect [c]ompetition” to thrive).
52. See JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 13 (16th ed. 2004) (“When the number of participants becomes really
great, some hope emerges that the influence of every particular participant will become
negligible, and that the above difficulties may recede and a more conventional theory
become possible. These are, of course, the classical conditions of ‘free competition.’
Indeed, this was the starting point of much of what is best in economic theory.”); see also
EDWIN MANSFIELD & GARY YOHE, MICROECONOMICS 356-57 (11th ed. 2004) (“The firm in
a perfectly competitive market has so many rivals that competition becomes impersonal in
the extreme . . . . A competitive firm faces so little of the market demand that its effective
demand curve is horizontal at whatever price the market will bear. A competitive firm can
decide only the output that it would like to supply to the market given that price.”); PINDYCK
& RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 327 (“In a perfectly competitive market, the large number
of sellers and buyers of a good ensures that no single seller or buyer can affect its price. The
market-forces of supply and demand determine price.”).
53. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 430 (“In [competitive] markets, each
firm could take price or market demand as given and largely ignore its competitors. In an
oligopolistic market, however, a firm sets price or output based partly on strategic
considerations regarding the behavior of its competitors.”). See also AREEDA, HOVENKAMP
& SOLOW, supra note 35, at 5 (“Each seller and buyer makes decisions independently,
without agreement with or influence of others.”); MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 52, at
426, 433-34 (“Unlike the case of . . . competition, the supply side of an oligopoly market is
composed of a few firms . . . . Conditions in oligopolistic industries tend to promote
collusion, since the number of firms is small and the firms recognize their interdependence.
The advantages to the firms of collusion seem obvious: increased profits, decreased
uncertainty, and a better opportunity to prevent others’ entry.”).
54. STEVEN E. LANDSBURG, PRICE THEORY & APPLICATIONS 634 (6th ed. 2005) (“[T]he
economist assumes that people are rational.”); see also AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW,
supra note 35 (discussing rational choice as an equimarginal principle.).
55. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 252 (“Because each individual firm
sells a sufficiently small proportion of total market output, its decisions have no impact on
market price . . . . The assumption of price taking applies to consumers as well as firms.”);
see also AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, supra note 35, at 5 (“Sellers and buyers are so
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3. There are no barriers to entry or exit with respect to consumer
or producer markets; 56
4. All market participants, that is, all buyers and sellers, are fully
informed of all relevant economic and technological data; 57
5. All products are homogeneous or, rather, constitute
interchangeable substitutes for each other; 58 and
6. The forces of supply and demand are free to determine the
quantity of output in a relevant market, and to determine a
market-clearing, competitive price of such output. 59
7. Ceteris Paribus, i.e., all other influences relevant to the

numerous that no individual’s output or purchasing decision has any perceptible impact on
output or price.”); MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 52, at 290 (“[P]erfect competition
requires that each participant in the market, whether a buyer or a seller, be so small in
relation to the entire market that he or she cannot affect the product’s price.”).
56. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 253 (“[F]ree entry (exit), means that
there are no special costs that make it difficult for a new firm either to enter an industry and
produce or to exit if it cannot make a profit. As a result, buyers can easily switch from one
supplier to another, and suppliers can easily enter or exit a market.”). See also AREEDA,
HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, supra note 35, at 5 (“All productive resources are freely mobile
among markets; there are no barriers to entry or exit.”); MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 52,
at 290 (“Perfect competition also requires that all resources be completely mobile. Each
resource must, in other words, be able to enter or leave the market with ease and to switch
from one use to another without fuss or bother.”).
57. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 595 (“[W]e have assumed that
consumers and producers have complete information about the economic variables that are
relevant for the choices they face.”); see also AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, supra note
35, at 5 (“All sellers and buyers have sufficient knowledge of all production techniques,
input costs, prices, and other relevant market facts.”); MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 52, at
290-91 (“[P]erfect competition requires that consumers, firms, and resource owners have
perfect knowledge of the relevant economic and technological data. Consumers must be
aware of all prices. Laborers and owners of capital must be aware of how much their
resources will bring in all possible uses. Firms must know the prices of all inputs and the
characteristics of all relevant technologies. And in its purest sense, perfect competition
requires that all of these economic decision-making units have an accurate knowledge of the
past, present, and the future.”).
58. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 252 (“Price-taking behavior typically
occurs in markets where firms produce identical, or nearly identical, products. When the
products of all of the firms are perfectly substitutable with one another—that is, when they
are homogeneous—no firm can raise the price of its product above the price of other firms
without losing most or all of its business.”); see also MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 52, at
405 (describing perfectly competitive situations as those in which numerous firms produce
and sell goods that are “completely homogenous from one seller to another.”).
59. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 55 (“The market mechanism is the
tendency for supply and demand to equilibrate (i.e., for price to move to the market-clearing
level), so that there is neither excess demand nor excess supply.”); see also MANSFIELD &
YOHE, supra note 52, at 347-48 (“We have seen that a perfectly competitive economy
maximizes the total net gain of consumers and producers. We then showed . . . how deadweight losses—reductions in economic efficiency—result if the government [obstructs the
forces of supply and demand by imposing] a price ceiling . . ., a price floor . . ., a tariff, a
quota, or an excise tax.”).
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perfectly-competitive model’s performance are equal. 60
According to microeconomic theory, if these conditions hold, the
perfectly-competitive model will create efficiencies in consumption,
production, and allocation. 61 And it is through the creation of such
efficiencies that a perfectly competitive market promises the greatest social
opportunity for wealth creation. Or in antitrust parlance, it promises
greater output at lower prices. 62
D.

Perfect Competition and its Condition of Rationality.

Central to the perfectly-competitive model is the assumption that all
market participants are rational, with rational action being defined by the
principle of utility/profit maximization. 63 Any act of consumption or
60. See WALTER NICHOLSON, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATION 56
(9th ed. 2004) [hereinafter NICHOLSON, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS] (“Much
economic analysis is based on this ceteris paribus (other things being equal) assumption.
[For example,] [w]e can simplify the analysis of a person’s consumption decisions by
assuming that satisfaction is affected only by choices made among the options being
considered. All other effects on satisfaction are assumed to remain constant. In this way we
can isolate the economic factors that affect consumption behavior. This narrow focus is not
intended to imply that other things that affect utility are unimportant; we are conceptually
holding these other factors constant so that we may study choices in a simplified setting.”);
see also WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY, BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSION
649 (9th ed. 2005) [hereinafter NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY] (defining the Ceteris
Paribus Assumption as “[t]he assumption that all other relevant factors are held constant
when examining the influence of one particular variable in an economic model”).
61. See VON NEUMANN & MORGENSTERN, supra, note 52 at 14 (“The current assertions
concerning free competition appear to be very valuable surmises and inspiring anticipations
of results. But they are not results and it is scientifically unsound to treat them as such as
along as the conditions which we mentioned above are not satisfied.”).
62. Sanderson v. Culligan Int’l Co., 415 F. 3d. 620, 623 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Judge
Easterbrook’s explanation that “[a]ntitrust law condemns practices that drive up prices by
curtailing output” (citations omitted)).
63. See COLANDER, supra note 40, at 6-8, 239 (describing the “profit-maximizing
entrepreneurial” nature of firms); PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 254 (“The
assumption of profit maximization is frequently used in microeconomics because it predicts
business behavior reasonably accurately and avoids unnecessary analytical complications.”);
see also COLANDER, supra note 40, at 181 (“The analysis of rational choice is the analysis of
how individuals choose goods within their budget in order to maximize total utility, and
how maximizing total utility can be accomplished by considering marginal utility. That
analysis begins with the premise that rational individuals want as much satisfaction as they
can get from their available resources. The term rational in economics means, specifically,
that people prefer more to less and will make choices that give them as much satisfaction as
possible.”); LANDSBURG, supra note 54, at 634 (“The economist assumes that people act
according to the principle of equimarginality. This is often expressed by saying that the
economist assume that people are rational. Indeed, it has been said that a student becomes a
true economist on the day when he fully understands and accepts the principle that people
equate costs and benefits at the margin.”); EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY
AND APPLICATIONS 55 (6th ed. 1988) (“Given the consumer’s tastes, we assume that he or
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production that fails to maximize the utility or profit of an individual or
firm is considered to be irrational economic behavior. Consequently, in
order to act rationally, all market participants must be fully informed of all
costs and benefits associated with their respective economic activities. 64
Once informed, an economically rational actor will weigh his or her costs
and benefits, and if the benefits exceed or equal his or her costs, he or she
will engage in such activity. 65 Consumers choose consumption levels that
maximize their interpersonal utility (i.e., satisfaction), given their specific
budget constraints. 66 Consumer utility is maximized where the marginal
benefit of an act of consumption is equal to its marginal cost. 67 Firms
choose output levels at which their marginal revenue equals marginal
cost. 68 Economic rationality necessarily requires that all costs and benefits
be considered when exercising economic choices. To the extent all such
costs and benefits are not considered, in that they are external to the
rational decision making process, non-utility/profit-maximizing choices
will be made resulting in unacceptable market inefficiencies. 69

she is rational, in the sense that he or she tries to maximize utility.”); STEPHEN A. MATHIS &
JANET KOSCIANSKI, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 2 (2002)
(“[M]aking rational choices is a matter of choosing amount(s) of some decision, or
independent, variable(s) such that the extra benefit received from the last unit chosen is just
equal to its extra costs. In economics, the process of measuring and comparing the extra
benefits and extra costs associated with a rational decision is known as marginal analysis.”).
64. See MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 52, at 290 (“[P]erfect competition requires that
consumers, firms, and resource owners have perfect knowledge of the relevant economic
and technological data. Firms must know the prices of all inputs and the characteristics of
all relevant technologies. And in its purest sense, perfect competition requires that all of
these economic decisions-making units have an accurate knowledge of the past, the present,
and the future.”).
65. See ANTHONY E. BOARDMAN ET AL., COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, CONCEPTS AND
PRACTICE 31 (3d ed. 2006) (explaining the net benefits criterion, which only encourages
adopting policies that maximize net benefits).
66. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 79 (discussing how consumers choose
which goods they will buy).
67. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 80 (“[S]atisfaction is maximized when
the marginal benefit—the benefit associated with the consumption of one additional unit of
food—is equal to the marginal cost—the cost of the additional unit of food.”).
68. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 259.
69. See MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 52, at 675 (“[P]roducers act in ways that cause
harm to others without paying the full cost of the damage. In these and other, similar cases,
the pursuit of private gain will not necessarily promote the social welfare.”).
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E.

Operational and Allocative Efficiency—The Perfectly-Competitive
Model’s Long-Run Equilibrium. 70

Operationally:

Competitive conditions ultimately force each firm in each market
to produce at the least possible cost permitted by known
techniques. Firms that fail to do so may temporarily break even
or perhaps make modest profits when demand is high, but will
incur losses and eventually disappear as resources commanded
by more efficient firms move into the market. In long-run
equilibrium, each firm will be producing at minimum average
total cost in plants of most efficient scale. 71
Allocatively:
The key conditions creating optimal allocative efficiency are
sufficiently large numbers of sellers and buyers in each market
and resource mobility. Where each individual seller’s output
decisions have no perceptible effect on price as given, any profit
maximization will impel each to produce that output at which the
added cost of the last unit (marginal cost) just equals price. If at
that point the sellers in some markets are earning higher profits,
(revenues in excess of total costs) then sellers in other markets
[and] resources will flow from the low-return to the high-return
markets until returns are equalized. In equilibrium, price will
equal marginal cost for all goods and services, and rates of return
(adjusted for risk) on investment in the various markets will be
equal and just sufficient to maintain investment at current levels.
Since each price equals the cost of the marginal unit of output,
consumer welfare is maximized; any rearrangement of inputs and
outputs can only decrease the aggregate value of what consumers
receive. 72

70. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 272-77 (providing a detailed and
robust discussion of the long-run equilibrium in competition).
71. AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, supra note 35, at 6.
72. Id. at 6.
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PERFECT COMPETITION IN THE SHORT-RUN &
THE PRICE-TAKING FIRM

Figure 2
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Figure 2 above illustrates short-run producer surplus 73 for a profitmaximizing (rational), price-taking firm in a competitive market. 74 As a
price-taker, 75 the market dictates an equilibrium quantity at a market
clearing price Pe. Acting independently 76 and rationally, 77 the firm will
seek to maximize profits at QS, where its marginal revenue equals its shortrun marginal costs (SMC = PC = Pe). 78 Because of the price-taking
73. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 269 (“If marginal cost is rising, the price
of the product is greater than marginal cost for every unit produced except the last one. As a
result, firms earn a surplus on all but the last unit of output. The producer surplus of a firm
is the sum over all units produced of the differences between the market price of the good
and the marginal costs of production. Just as consumer surplus measures all of the area
below an individual’s demand curve and above the market price, producer surplus measures
the area above a producer’s supply curve and below the market price.”).
74. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 269-71 (explaining the measure of
producer surplus in the short run).
75. See supra note 55 for an explanation of the price-taking condition of perfect
competition as a function of both the number of competitive firms in the market and their
respective market shares with respect to units produced. For example, given the number of
firms and their respective productive capacities, no one firm can influence price by the
amount of inputs it consumes or units it produces.
76. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 54 and 63 and accompanying text.
78. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 269 (“Figure 8.11 illustrates short-run
producer surplus for a firm. The profit-maximizing output is [QS] where [PC = SMC]. The
producer surplus is then the sum of these “unit surpluses” over all units that the firm
produces. It is given by the . . . [the area under the PC –price-line, the firm’s perceived
horizontal demand curve] and above its marginal cost curve [SMC], from zero output to the
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condition, an individual firm in competition perceives a perfectly elastic,
horizontal demand curve (dith). Since the forces of supply and demand set a
market clearing price of Pe, a firm perceives an infinite demand—i.e., it can
and will sell all of its units of production at whatever price the market sets.
For each unit sold, the firm will be paid the market price of Pe = PC; and for
each additional unit sold by the firm, the firm will receive additional
revenue equal to the market price of Pe = PC. The market price (Pe) equals
the firm’s marginal revenue (MR) associated with the firm’s additional unit
sales. 79 Consequently, the firm’s short-run marginal revenue curve
corresponds to its perceived individual demand curve (dith). 80
The firm’s individual supply curve corresponds to its marginal cost
curve; 81 it reflects the various quantities of output the firm is willing to
supply with respect to a corresponding schedule of prices. 82 The market
supply curve may roughly be approximated by “the horizontal summation
of the short-run supply curves of all the firms in the industry.” 83 In Figure
profit-maximizing output.”).
79. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 245 (defining “marginal revenue: the
change in revenue resulting from a one-unit increase in output.”); see also COLANDER, supra
note 40, at 245 (“Since profit is the difference between total revenue and total cost, what
happens to profit in response to a change in output is determined by marginal revenue (MR),
the change in total revenue associated with a change in quantity . . . .”); NICHOLSON,
MICROECONOMIC THEORY, supra note 60, at 251-52 (“It is the revenue obtained from selling
one more unit of output that is relevant to the profit-maximizing firm’s output decision. If
the firm can sell all it wishes without having any effect on market price, the market price
will indeed be the extra revenue obtained from selling one more unit. Phrased another way,
if a firm’s output decisions will not affect market price, marginal revenue is equal to the
price at which the unit sells.”).
80. See MARK HIRSCHEY, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS 384 (10th ed. 2003) (“[T]he firm’s
demand curve is seen to be, for all practical purposes, a horizontal line. Thus, it is clear that
under perfect competition, the individual firm’s output decisions do not affect price in any
meaningful way. Price can be assumed constant irrespective of the output level at which the
firm chooses to operate.”); see also MARK HIRSCHEY, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS 386 Figure
10.3 (illustrating that “[f]irms face horizontal curves in perfectly competitive markets”).
81. See id. at 389 (“The perfectly competitive firm’s short-run supply curve
corresponds to that portion of the marginal cost curve that lies above the average variable
cost curve.”); MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 52, at 296 (“The short-run supply curve is, by
construction, exactly the same as the firm’s short-run marginal-cost curve . . . .”). Similar
to the term marginal revenue, marginal cost “is the increase (decrease) in total cost from
increasing (or decreasing) the level of output by one unit.” COLANDER, supra note 40 at
259; see also supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text (explaining how the basic theory of
the firm is to maximize their profits).
82. See NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY, supra note 60, at 257 (“The firm’s
short-run supply curve show how much it will produce at various possible prices. For a
profit-maximizing firm that takes the price of its output as given, this curve consists of the
positively sloped segment of the firm’s short-run marginal cost above the point of minimum
average variable cost.”).
83. MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 52, at 297; see also COLANDER, supra note 40, at
254 (“In the short-run when the number of firms in the market is fixed, the market supply
curve is just the horizontal sum of all the firm’s marginal cost curves, taking account of any
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2, the firm produces QS units, given a market price of Pe = Pc, reaping
short-run profits (πs) equal to the area of ABCD. 84
It is noted that “[a] firm need not always earn a profit in the shortrun.” 85 In fact, as a price-taker, the firm may find itself confronted with a
market price that falls below its short-run average costs (Pe < SAC) and
thus be forced to operate at a loss or exit the industry. Under such
circumstances, a firm may nonetheless continue to operate at a short-run
loss because it expects to earn profits in the future “when the price of its
product increases or the cost of production falls, and because shutting down
and starting up again would be costly.” 86 If the market price, however, “is
less than [short-run] average variable costs, the firm should produce
nothing and incur a loss equal to total fixed costs. Losses will increase if
any output is produced and sold when P < [SAVC].” 87 Under such
circumstances, the firm should shut down and exit the industry.
The perfectly-competitive model’s lack of entry and exit barriers 88
suggests that profits attract market entry. When a firm experiences losses,
such losses encourage market exit. Such entry and exit cause market
supply to expand or contract as reflected by a shift of the market supply
curve (S) either to the right or left, respectively. For example, Figure 3
below illustrates the impact on the firm’s profits in competition as such
profits attract entry. For the purpose of simplicity, it is assumed that “there
are no sunk costs so that average economic cost is equal to average total
cost.” 89 Attracted by the profits reflected in Figure 3, firms enter the
market, causing the supply curve (S) to shift to (S'), causing the market
price to fall to PC', which is below the firm’s short-run average cost curve
(SAC). At a market price equal to PC', the firm experiences losses equal to
the area of rectangle ABCD. And since it is assumed that no sunk costs
exist, the firm can easily exit the market and invest its capital in other
markets with higher returns. 90 Thus, “the firm should shut down when the
changes in input prices that might occur.”); HIRSCHEY, supra note 80, at 389 (“Market
supply curves are the sum of supply for individual firms at various prices.”).
84. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 269-71 (explaining the formula π
(profit) = Total Revenues (TR) – Total Costs (TC); TR = PC * QS = area of ABFE; TC = PI
(Average Cost of Inputs) * QS = area of DCFE; πS = area of ABCD = area of ABFE (total
revenue) – area of DCFE (total costs)).
85. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 259.
86. Id.
87. HIRSCHEY, supra note 80, at 389 (“If price exceeds average variable costs, then each
unit of output provides at least some profit contribution to help cover fixed costs and
provide profit. The minimum point on the firm’s average variable cost curve determines the
lower limit, or cutoff point, of its supply schedule.”).
88. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (defining free entry as the absence of
special costs associated with beginning or halting operations in a market).
89. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 259.
90. See id. (explaining firm incentives in the absence of sunk costs).
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price of its product is less than the average total cost at the profitmaximizing output.” 91
PERFECT COMPETITION IN THE SHORT-RUN &
THE PRICE-TAKING FIRM AFTER COMPETITIVE ENTRY

Figure 3
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With the decline of the market price to PC' and the resulting short-run
losses, the hypothetical firm above (as well as other firms similarly
situated) will rationally opt to exit the market. Thus, market supply will
contract, as reflected by a shift of the market supply curve from S' to S''
illustrated in Figure 4 below. 92 Ultimately, a long-run competitive
equilibrium is reached when all firms in the market are maximizing profits
at the new competitive equilibrium price, PC'' = SAC = SMC. At PC'', the
firm is earning zero economic profits, which “means that the firm is
earning a normal—i.e., competitive—return on that investment.” 93 Stated
91. Id.
92. COLANDER, supra note 40, at 255 (“[I]f the price is lower than the price necessary to
earn a profit, firms incurring losses will leave the market and the market supply curve will
shift to the left. As market supply shifts to the left, market price will rise. Firms will
continue to exit the market and market price will continue to rise until all remaining firms
no longer incur losses and earn zero profit. Only at zero profit do entry and exit stop.”).
93. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 273; see also COLANDER, supra note 40,
at 255 (“Zero profit does not mean that entrepreneurs don’t get anything for their efforts.
The entrepreneur is an input to production just like any other factor of production. In order
to stay in the business the entrepreneur must receive the opportunity cost, or normal profit
(the amount the owners of business would have received in the next-best alternative). That
normal profit is built into the costs of the firm; economic profits are profits above normal
profits.”); DOMINICK SALVATORE, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 332
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differently, a firm earning a normal return on its investment “is doing as
well . . . as it could by investing elsewhere.” 94 As one economist explains,
“[i]f the owner manages the firm, zero economic profits also include what
he or she would earn in the best alternative occupation (i.e., managing the
firm for someone else). Thus, zero economic profits means that the total
revenues of the firm just cover all costs (explicit and implicit).” 95

Figure 4

LONG-RUN COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM &
THE PRICE-TAKING FIRM AFTER COMPETITIVE EXIT
Firm in Competition

Market Supply and Demand

SMC = Sith firm

S''
SAC
PC''

S'

D
QS

In figure 4 above, there is little incentive for the firm to exit the
market; similarly, there is little incentive for other firms to enter the
market. 96 In summary:
[F]irms in long-run equilibrium must produce at the minimum of
their long-run average-cost curves. How so? Firms set price
equal to long-run marginal cost to maximize their economic
(5th ed. 2004) (“When a perfectly competitive market is in long-run equilibrium, firms
break even and earn zero economic profits. Therefore, the owner of the firm receives only a
normal return on investment or an amount equal to what he or she would earn by investing
his or her funds in the best alternative venture of similar risk.”).
94. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 273.
95. SALVATORE, supra note 93, at 332.
96. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 274 (outlining the conditions under longrun competitive equilibrium).
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profits. But long-run equilibrium in the market can be sustained
only if price equals long-run average cost so that economic
profits are equal to [zero] and returns to employed resources are
normal. And both of these conditions are satisfied only where
long-run marginal cost equals long-run average cost at the
minimum of the long-run average cost curve. 97
The zero economic profit condition of the perfectly-competitive
model’s long-run equilibrium “is enormously powerful.” 98 It ultimately
explains and demonstrates the importance of the model’s underlying
conditions—i.e., (a) numerous price-taking buyers and sellers, (b) each
acting independently and rationally, (c) subject to little, if any, entry and
exit barriers, (d) all acting upon complete and accurate market information
involving the demand and supply for a homogeneous good (e) with little or
no governmental intervention and interference or obstruction of the
equilibrating forces of supply and demand, with all other potential
influences remaining constant or equal (ceteris paribus). When these
conditions hold, the perfectly competitive market guides and directs scarce
resources to their highest and most valued uses, and thereby minimizes, if
not eliminates, waste.
If economic profits are being earned in any given competitive market,
rational firms will exit their existing market where they are earning only
normal profits and redirect their resources to the more profitable market.
Provided there are no barriers to exit and entry, and provided that all
competing firms have access to complete and accurate market information,
competitive entry will chisel away at the otherwise-available profits until a
long-run equilibrium of zero economic, but normal profits is reached.
Upon attaining such a long-run equilibrium, rational firms are faced with
the choice of (1) being satisfied with earning normal profits, (2) pursuing
cost-saving innovations necessary for the firm to earn above-normal,
economic profits once again (attracting additional competitive entry), or (3)
exiting the market in search of above-normal, economic profits elsewhere.
Option 1 (being satisfied with earning normal profits) is dangerous,
especially if other competitors continue to seek cost-saving innovations.
Complacency in the market may lead to market exit. Option 2 (pursuing
cost-saving innovations necessary to once again earn above-normal,
economic profits) is rational from both short- and long-run perspectives. In
the short-run, success in the discovery and implementation of cost-saving
97. MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 52, at 307.
98. COLANDER, supra note 40, at 255 (“[I]t makes the analysis of competitive markets
far more applicable to the real world than can a strict application of the assumption of
perfect competition. If economic profit is being made, firms will enter and compete [sic]
that profit away. Price will be pushed down to the average total cost of production as long
as there are no barriers to entry.”).
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innovations will likely lead to short-run economic profits. In the long-run,
such innovations will continue to drive input costs down, making more
goods available at decreasing market prices. Option 3 (exiting the market
and searching for above-normal, economic profits elsewhere) may have a
temporary, but slight, short-run effect on the market from which the firm is
exiting. It will, however, have a countervailing short-run effect on the
market that the resources ultimately enter, with both markets subject to a
renewed long-run equilibrium of normal profits. 99

Figure 5

PERFECT COMPETITION IN THE LONG-RUN &
THE PRICE-TAKING FIRM AFTER COMPETITIVE EXIT
Firm in Competition

Market Supply and Demand

SMC = Sith firm
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Figure 5 above illustrates the continued competitive pressure on a
firm’s cost structure. As firms exit the market to minimize and/or eliminate
their short-run losses and seek normal or above-normal profits elsewhere,
the market supply curve (S') contracts and shifts to the left to (S''), 100
99. See HIRSCHEY, supra note 80, at 404 for a more detailed discussion on competitive
strategy in perfectly competitive markets. “Competitive strategy is the search for a
favorable competitive position and durable above normal profits in an industry or line of
business.” Id.
100. See HIRSCHEY, supra note 80, at 74 (“In functional form, a supply function can be
expressed as Quantity of Product X Supplied= f(Price of X, Prices of Related Goods, Input
Prices, Weather, and so on.”). And as previously stated, the market supply curve is derived
from the horizontal summation of all of the individual firms’ marginal-cost curves. See
supra note 46 and accompanying text. Consequently, as firms leave the market, the market
supply curve will shift to the left, especially since it is a function of the number of suppliers
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resulting in a new competitive price of (PC''). At (PC''), the firm earns
normal profits. The desire to earn economic profits (above normal profits)
places long-run downward pressure on a competitive firm’s costs of
production. Thus, the firm must innovatively reduce its overall cost
structure to continue to earn economic profits. Successful innovation
drives a competitive firm’s cost structure down; with its cost curves
shifting downward, it will again reap short-run, above-normal, economic
profits. Such profits will again attract market entry and, provided all of the
underlying conditions of competition continue to hold, a new long-run
equilibrium will once again be reached, reflecting lower market prices and
zero economic profits.
It is within this context that such a condition is “enormously
powerful.” 101 The perfectly-competitive model’s condition of zero longrun economic profits nurtures its creative, innovative and progressive
nature.
Competition may . . . impel firms to be efficient in seeking a new
or improved products and new cost-saving production
techniques. With markets in equilibrium and prices just covering
costs, such innovations would be the only way by which higher
profits could be achieved . . . . Whenever innovating effort takes
resources and hence involves costs, the effort will not be made
absent the prospect of an appropriate reward. To the extent that
innovations become quickly known and quickly copied by others
without cost to them, competitive pricing will prevent the
innovator from recovering its innovation costs. Thus, it is
probable that appropriate allocation of resources to innovative
efforts requires at least lags in competitive response and perhaps
even further guarantees or prospects of reward . . . . [A]ntitrust
policy must be appropriately concerned not only with rules that
hinder innovation unnecessarily, but also with rules that are too
lenient toward restraints or other limitations on innovation. 102

It is within this context that Adam Smith praised laissez faire political
economies for their “great multiplication of the production of all the
different arts . . . which occasions, in a well-governed society, that
universal opulence which extends itself to the lowest ranks of the
people.” 103 Note Smith’s observation was dependent on a qualified,
in the market.
101. COLANDER, supra note 40 at 255; see also supra text accompanying note 98.
102. AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, supra note 35, at 7.
103. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 11 (Edwin Cannan ed., Random House, 1937) (1776) (“It is the great
multiplication of the production of all the different arts, in consequence of the division of
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institutional framework capable of cultivating “a well-governed society.”
Thus, the institutional, governing framework of any laissez-faire based
society must adopt and administer laws that nurture, promote and/or
advance the fundamental tenets of the perfectly competitive economic
model and all its underlying conditions.
F.

Ceteris Paribus.

The laws of the social sciences, including economics, are generalized
statements of “social” or “economic tendencies;” 104 they are statements that
“a certain course of action may be expected under certain conditions.” 105 It
has been explained that the law of economics, as with every other science,
“undertakes to study the effects which will be produced by certain causes,
not absolutely, but subject to the condition that other things are equal, and
that the causes are able to work out their effects undisturbed.” 106
Almost every scientific doctrine, when carefully and formally
stated, will be found to contain some proviso to the effect that
other things are equal: the action of the causes in question is
supposed to be isolated; certain effects are attributed to them, but
only on the hypothesis that no cause is permitted to enter except
those distinctly allowed for. 107
labor, which occasions, in a well-governed society, that universal opulence which extends
itself to the lowest ranks of the people. Every workman has a great quantity of his own
work to dispose of beyond what he himself has occasion for; and every other workman
being exactly in the same situation, he is enabled to exchange a great quantity of his own
goods for a great quantity, or, what comes to the same thing, for the price of a great quantity
of theirs. He supplies them abundantly with what they have occasion for, and they
accommodate him as amply with what he has occasion for, and a general plenty diffuses
itself through all the different ranks of society.”).
104. ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 33 (8th ed., MacMillan and Co.
1920) (1890) (discussing how laws are statements of social and economic tendencies); see
also EKKEHART SCHLICHT, ISOLATION AND AGGREGATION IN ECONOMICS 1 (1985)
(“[E]conomics is not concerned with the idiosyncrasies of particular cases, but looks for
general rules linking typical incidents. Usually these rules cannot be distilled stringently
from the multitude of individual actions, and economics is bound, hence, to start from
assumptions on behavior of aggregates—or ’representative’ agents—which are linked to
individual actions just vaguely.”).
105. MARSHALL, supra note 104, at 87.
106. MARSHALL, supra note 104, at 36; see also SCHLICHT, supra note 104, at 3
(“Economic data are not ultimate data, like the speed of light in physics. Rather they are
provisional in nature. This is expressed by means of the ceteris paribus clause. All factors
not explicitly considered as variables are assumed to be fixed within an argument. This
clause is used, explicitly or implicitly, throughout economics.”).
107. MARSHALL, supra note 104, at 36; see also SCHLICHT, supra note 104, at 1
(“Economic phenomena are the outcomes of a plethora of factors, and economic analysis,
unable to tackle them all, is compelled to select those factors which seem to be the most
important, and to consider all other influences as data of the analysis. But these data are
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The Ceteris Paribus assumption (or condition), while one of the most
important operational conditions of the perfectly-competitive model, is
probably the one condition that is rarely addressed, likely to be taken for
granted, and often ignored. Ceteris Paribus is a qualifying assumption of a
generalized law, generally asserting an axiomatic truth assuming “other
things being equal.” 108 Although its use as a qualifying economic
assumption dates as far back as 1662, 109 John Cairnes (in his 1857 work
titled The Character and Logical Method of Political Economy) “is
credited with enunciating the idea that the conclusions of economic
investigations hold ‘only in the absence of disturbing causes.’” 110 Alfred
Marshall further popularized ceteris paribus as a qualifying economic
assumption in his Principles of Economics published in 1890. 111 Although
ceteris paribus assumptions (or conditions) are critical to the application
and operation of generalized conventional economic constructs, they are
often cavalierly mentioned for the mere purpose of textural completeness
by analysts and academics alike.
Whether classified as either a
“comparative” 112 or “exclusive” 113 ceteris paribus assumption (or
only provisional since they are wandering themselves. One characteristic of economic
analysis is, then, that it is built on a moving foundation.” (emphasis added)).
108. Ceteris Paribus, MSN ENCARTA, http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/
refpages/search.aspx?q=ceteris+paribus (last visited Oct. 31, 2008) (defining ceteris paribus
as “other things being equal.”); see also CETERUS PARIBUS LAWS (John Earman, Clark
Glymour & Sandra Mitchell eds. 2002) (providing general and historical discussion of
ceteris paribus clauses).
109. See CETERUS PARIBUS LAWS, supra note 108, at 1 (citing J. Persky, Ceteris Paribus,
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 4, 187-93 (1990) as having traced its use as far back
as WILLIAM PETTY, TREATISE OF TAXES AND CONTRIBUTIONS (1662)).
110. See CETERUS PARIBUS LAWS, supra note 108, at 1 (citing J. CAIRNES, THE
CHARACTER AND LOGICAL METHOD OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1857)).
111. See CETERUS PARIBUS LAWS, supra note 108, at 1 (citing ALFRED MARSHALL,
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (1890)) (discussing how the classic example of a ceteris paribus
law was made more pervasive by Marshall’s work); see also MARSHALL, supra note 104, at
29-37 (considering the nature of economic laws).
112. See Gerhard Schurz, Ceteris Paribus Laws: Classification and Deconstruction, 57
ERKENNTNIS 351, 351-52 (2002) (“The comparative sense of CP-clauses derives from the
literal meaning of ‘ceteris paribus’ as ‘the others being equal.’ A comparative CP-law
makes an assertion about functional properties, henceforth called parameters. It claims the
increase (or decrease) of one parameter, say f(x), leads to an increase (or decrease) of
another parameter, say g(x), provided that all other (unknown) parameters describing the
states of the underlying system(s) remain the same. Thus, a comparative CP-clause does
not exclude the presence of other ‘disturbing’ factors, but merely requires that they are kept
constant.”).
113. See id. at 352 (“In the philosophical debate, however, CP-laws have usually been
understood in the different exclusive sense. An exclusive CP-law asserts that a certain state
or event-type expressed by a (possibly complex) predicate Ax leads to another state or eventtype Cx provided disturbing influences are absent. Ax is called the antecedent and Cx the
consequent predicate. Thus an exclusive CP-clause does not merely require keeping all
other causally interfering factors constant; it rather excludes the presence of causally
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condition), ceteris paribus assumptions nonetheless have a robust
significance with respect to the application of generalized economic laws
and theories. Accordingly, they should not be understated nor ignored.
If all of the operational conditions of the perfectly-competitive model
hold, then microeconomic theory instructs that the model’s efficiencies in
consumption, production, and allocation will ultimately result to the favor
of society, ceteris paribus (assuming all other things remain equal and/or
the absence of all other disturbing influences). To the extent social
scientists and economists can identify and eliminate such disturbing
influences, such influences remain equal and constant (in their absence).
This article specifically addresses the ceteris paribus condition that all
market participants are subject to the same geopolitical institutional rules,
regulations and conventions. To the extent that different rules, regulations,
and conventions apply to competing participants within a single market,
such differences will likely have an isolated and disturbing influence on the
generalized laws of microeconomics discussed above.
Consequently, in analyzing whether the hiring of an illegal alien
worker (unauthorized by law to participate in a specific labor market) may
jeopardize the efficiencies of perfect competition, it is important to
acknowledge that the generalized laws of competitive efficiency constitute
ceteris paribus laws; that is, they necessarily require that all other
influences remain equal and/or the absence of all other disturbing
influences. The generalized economic laws of efficiency for which the
perfectly-competitive model is highly touted will hold and inure to the
benefit of society provided the regulations prohibiting illegal alien workers
(or for that matter any other cohort of individuals) from participating in a
specific labor market apply equally to all market participants (i.e., ceteris
paribus). Or alternatively stated, the extent that market rules and
regulations are not equally applied to all market participants, the
assumption (or condition) of ceteris paribus is violated; that is, the unequal
application of laws and regulations relevant to the market will undoubtedly
have disturbing influences on the generalized axioms of the perfectlycompetitive economic model.
Drawing on prior research, this article will return to its discussion of
the ceteris paribus assumption in following sections when specifically
addressing whether the act of hiring illegal alien workers actually
constitutes an unfair trade practice and/or restraint of trade resulting in a
competitive injury.

interfering factors. In agreement with this exclusive understanding, [it has been] remarked
that ‘the literal translation is ‘other things being equal’; but it would be more apt to read
‘ceteris paribus’ as ‘other things being right.’”).
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Antitrust Injury.

Antitrust injury is an “injury of the type the antitrust laws were
intended to prevent.” 114 It is regarded to be synonymous with “injury to
competition,” 115 and is frequently understood to reference the curtailment
of output and higher prices. 116 Proof of “antitrust injury” is now an
essential element of proof in private antitrust actions under virtually all
antitrust laws. 117 And since the Supreme Court has previously held that
“the antitrust laws . . . were enacted for the protection of competition,” 118
then it logically follows that the “injury should reflect the anticompetitive
effect” 119 resulting from a violation of the antitrust laws.
It is from this perspective that the author of this article argues that
microeconomics and its model of perfect competition proffer an analytical
paradigm for assessing whether market conduct is likely to result in injury
to competition, one of the essential prima facie elements of a federal
antitrust cause of action.
Instruction on the requisite antecedent conditions underlying the
perfectly-competitive model not only dramatically simplifies the
task of understanding antitrust precedent, but also provides an
analytical framework for identifying anticompetitive conduct
114. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977); see also
Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 113 (1986) (reiterating its ruling in
Brunswick that “a private plaintiff must allege threatened loss or damage ‘of the type the
antitrust laws were designed to prevent.’”); Kevin S. Marshall, The Economics of
Competitive Injury, 45 BRANDEIS L. J. 345, 345 [hereinafter Marshall, Competitive Injury]
(quoting Supreme Court’s definition of antitrust injury in Brunswick).
115. Healow v. Anesthesia Partners, 92 F.3d 1192, 1996-2 Trade Cas. ¶ 71,567 (9th Cir.,
unpublished), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1117 (1996) (holding that there was no antitrust injury
because the underlying market structure did not support any inference of “injury to
competition”).
116. See Sanderson v. Culligan Int’l Co., 415 F. 3d. 620, 623 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating that
antitrust law “condemns practices that drive up prices by curtailing output”); see also,
NCAA v. Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 103-07 (1984) (finding that because the NCAA’s
television plan restrained prices and output it had an anticompetitive effect); Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979) (stating that court’s must examine
whether the effect of a practice is to decrease output and restrict competition); William H.
Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization, Antitrust
Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221, 1268-71 & 1272 n. 253 (1989)
(analyzing legal history of antitrust injury doctrine and finding that most appropriate
standard for causation in antitrust injury is whether size of injury that plaintiff claims is in
direct proportion to the restriction in output alleged by the practice).
117. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND
ITS PRACTICE 605 (3d ed. 2005) (discussing the elements of antitrust injury that a plaintiff
must show to recover).
118. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 488 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 320 (1962)).
119. Id. at 489.
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independent of precedential constraint. Once the requisite
antecedent conditions for competition to thrive are identified and
understood, the jurist, the antitrust practitioner, and the economic
analyst are in a superior position from which to analyze
anticompetitive conduct that may trigger statutory liability.120
If the above conditions must be met [in order] for the perfectly
competitive market to thrive, then from a purely economic perspective, it
follows that any market conduct or activity that impairs, threatens,
suppresses or jeopardizes any one or more of such underlying conditions
must be discouraged as a matter of public policy. It is in this context that
the [referenced] underlying conditions provide a powerful analytical
paradigm for identifying market conduct or activity that may likely
constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade, an unfair method of
competition, and a competitive injury. 121
In the following section, it is demonstrated that a firm that hires an
illegal alien worker at below-market wages generates several
anticompetitive effects. Such conduct directly and negatively impacts
several of the operational conditions of perfect competition, thereby
obstructing its ability to create the efficiencies for which it is universally
regarded.
IV. THE ECONOMICS OF HIRING ILLEGAL ALIEN WORKERS
While graduate students of business are routinely taught to search for
“favorable competitive position[s] and durable above-normal profits,” 122
public policy, nonetheless, proscribes the use of “anticompetitive” conduct
for such purposes. 123 To reiterate,
120. Kevin S. Marshall, Product Disparagement Under the Sherman Act, Its Nurturing
and Injurious Effects to Competition, and the Tension Between Jurisprudential Economics
and Microeconomics, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 231, 235-36 (2006) [hereinafter Marshall,
Product Disparagement]; see also Marshall, Competitive Injury, supra note 114, at 351
(2007) (quoting same).
121. Marshall, Product Disparagement, supra note 120, at 238 (emphasis added); see
also Marshall, Competitive Injury, supra note 114, at 354 (quoting same).
122. HIRSCHEY, supra note 80, at 404.
123. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 47
(1978) (referencing the passage of the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts). Bork
observes that “some economic practices are particularly suspect, somehow not normal,
because they provide means, other than superior efficiency, by which a firm may gain or
keep a monopoly position. But this notion, whose dangers have already been sketched,
attained new potency because it was coupled with a second idea, the concept of incipiency.
To recapitulate briefly, this consists of the theory that the anticompetitive potential of
suspect practices may be discerned, and the practices stopped, well before they have actual
anticompetitive consequences.”) Id.; see also HIRSCHEY, supra note 80, at 534 (“Antitrust
policy in the United States is designed to protect competition . . . . In a vigorously
competitive economic environment, there will be corporate winners and losers. This is fine
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In [long-run] equilibrium, perfectly competitive markets only
offer the potential for a normal rate of return on investment. If
many capable competitors offer identical products, vigorous price
competition tends to eliminate disequilibrium profits. The only
exception to this rule is superior efficiency can sometimes lead to
superior profits, even in perfectly competitive markets. Abovenormal profits in perfectly competitive industries are usually
transitory and reflect the influences of economic rents, luck, or
disequilibrium conditions. If above-normal returns persist for
extended periods in a given industry or line of business, elements
of uniqueness are probably at work. 124
To the extent that a competitor achieves above-normal returns, in
defiance of the perfectly-competitive model’s condition of long-run zero
economic profits, suggests either (1) continued entrepreneurial innovation
and enhanced efficiencies in production, or (2) an otherwise suspect
imperfectly competitive market driven by unique conditions. In the case of
sustained above-normal profits resulting from the hiring of illegal alien
workers, such above-normal profits are driven by distorted, below-market
labor costs. Such below-market labor costs ultimately create single-firm
market power sufficient to jeopardize and threaten several of the perfectlycompetitive model’s underlying conditions, i.e., the model’s necessary
conditions of price-taking participants, no entry or exit barriers, fully
informed buyers and sellers, and ceteris paribus are all at risk by a firm’s
unlawful hiring of illegal alien workers, provided such conduct is driven by
the firm’s realization of below-market labor costs.

so long as the game is played fairly. When unfair methods of competition emerge, antitrust
policy is brought to bear.”).
124. HIRSCHEY, supra note 80, at 404.
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Perfect Competition and the Price-Taking Firm with Long-Run Zero
Economic Profits.

Figure 6

PERFECT COMPETITION & THE PRICE-TAKING FIRM
WITH LONG-RUN ZERO ECONOMIC PROFITS
Firm in Competition
Market Supply and Demand
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Figure 6 above illustrates a rational (profit-maximizing), price-taking
firm in long-run equilibrium experiencing zero economic profits. At
market price Pe = PC (competitive price charged by firm), firm will produce
quantity QS, where the market price line, the firm’s marginal revenue (MR)
curve and its perceived horizontal demand curve (dth) intersect its long-run
marginal cost curve (LMC) at the minimum point of its long-run average
total cost curve (LATC). Given that all of the previously discussed
underlying conditions of perfect competition hold, the market will produce
quantity Qe units at a market clearing price of Pe. At PeQe, the market
minimizes, if not eliminates, waste in an economic environment of scarcity.
If the firm decides to seek above-normal profits (i.e., economic
profits) by engaging in the unlawful hiring of illegal alien workers at a
below-market wage rate, such conduct will artificially drive the firm’s
entire cost structure downward, with its marginal cost, average total cost,
and average variable cost curves all shifting downward, allowing it to again
realize above-normal economic profits. The firm’s lower cost structure,
however, is not the result of entrepreneurial innovation characterized by
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inventiveness, ingenuity, or resourcefulness. Rather, the firm’s lower cost
structure is realized by the unlawful activity of hiring illegal alien workers
at below-market wage rates. The lower cost structure is the result of the
intentional violation of the ceteris paribus condition of the perfectlycompetitive model. This lower cost structure is the disturbing influence on
the model’s generalized efficiencies caused by a firm’s willingness to
leverage the unequal economic playing field created by its anticompetitive
and unlawful conduct.
B.

Predation and the Violation of Ceteris Paribus.

PREDATION AND THE VIOLATION OF CERTERIS PARIBUS
(DISTORTING MARKET INPUT COSTS)
Figure 7
Predatory Firm
(Distorting Input Costs by Hiring Illegal
Alien Workers)

Market Supply and Demand

S = ΣSMCith
LMC′

firm

PC

A
dith= MR =Pe
LATC

PP *
PP

′

D

B
LAVC'

'

′

QS

QS'

Qe

Figure 7 above illustrates the downward shift in the firm’s entire cost
structure realized by its hiring of illegal alien workers at below-market
wage rates. As a result of its unlawful conduct, its long-run marginal cost,
average total cost, and average variable cost curves shift to LMC', LATC',
and LAVC' respectively. As a rational profit-maximizer, the firm’s output
will increase from QS to QS' should it decide to continue to sell its output at
the market price of Pe = PC, allowing it potential above-normal profits equal
to the area of rectangle PCABPP*. The firm’s increased output will likely
have an impact on the market price to the extent it causes total supply to
shift to the right. To the extent that market output exceeds and is to the
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right of Qe, the “but for” equilibrium quantity (but for the firm’s unlawful
hiring of illegal alien workers), such output will be a distortion of the
supply and demand forces, resulting in economic waste. More will be
produced than the forces of supply and demand would otherwise dictate,
and resources will no longer be driven to their highest valued uses.
Furthermore, to the extent market price declines ever so slightly as a result
of the firm’s increase in output, other market competitors (who refuse to
breach the condition of ceteris paribus by engaging in similar unlawful
conduct), who otherwise would be experiencing a long-run equilibrium of
zero economic profits, will now likely be facing losses at the margins.
C.

Market Power and Sustained, Long-Run Above Normal Profits.

Figure 8
MARKET POWER & SUSTAINED, LONG-RUN ABOVE NORMAL PROFITS
Market Supply and Demand
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As discussed earlier in this paper, 125 “it is the revenue obtained from
selling one more unit of output that is relevant to the profit-maximizing
firm’s output decision. If the firm can sell all it wishes without having any
effect on price, the market price will indeed be the extra revenue obtained
from selling one more unit.” 126 In perfect competition, a rational, profitmaximizing firm will fix its output where its marginal cost equals its

125. See supra Part III(E), and specifically notes 68, 76-80 and accompanying text.
126. NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY, supra note 60, at 251.
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marginal revenue, which is equal to the market price (MR = MC = Pe). In
perfect competition, firms are consequently price-takers; they each produce
such a negligible amount of the total market supply that none are capable of
affecting price by the amount they choose to produce.
Figure 8 above illustrates the newly created market power 127 realized
from the firm’s artificially lowered cost structure, resulting from its
unlawful hiring of illegal alien workers at below-market wage rates. The
market price (as determined by the unfettered forces of supply and demand)
equals Pe. However, because of the firm’s newly lowered cost structure (as
reflected by the MC, ATC and AVC curves in Figure 8), the firm now has
the power to increase its output by setting its price somewhere between PC
= Pe and PP. 128

127. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 328 (“[M]arket power: the ability—
of either a seller or a buyer—to affect the price of a good.”); see also ABA SECTION OF
ANTITRUST LAW, MARKET POWER HANDBOOK: COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMIC
FOUNDATIONS 5 (2005) (“The economic concept of market power is central to the legal
analysis of most antitrust cases. Like economists, courts have used the term ‘market power’
to describe situations in which a firm or group of firms have control over price and
output.”); 13 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 291, ¶2211c (2nd ed. 2005) (“While courts sometimes
define ‘market power’ as involving either the power to raise price above cost or else the
power to exclude . . . .”).
128. NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY, supra note 60, at 252 (“A firm may not
always be able to sell all it wants at the prevailing market price, however. If it faces a
downward-sloping demand curve for its product, more output can be sold only by reducing
the good’s price. In this case the revenue obtained from selling one more unit will be less
than the price of that unit because, in order to get more consumers to take the extra unit, the
price of all other units must be lowered.”).
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Predation, Market Power, Arbitrary Market Exit and Barriers to
Entry.

Figure 9
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FIRM A
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Figure 9 above further illustrates Firm A’s newly created market
power as defined by its ability to set price between the otherwise given
market price of Pe = PC and PP while continuing to earn above-normal
economic profits. In the absence of Firm A’s unlawful conduct of
employing illegal alien workers at below-market wage rates, Firm B will
experience long-run zero economic profits, or rather, normal-profits. Firm
A, however, can prey on Firm B and others similarly situated in the market
by wielding its market power by setting price below the otherwise given
market price, and thus, setting price below Firm B’s average total cost
curve at PP'. In such a situation, Firm B has no choice but to meet Firm A’s
price of PP', especially since Firm B is a price-taker by definition (unless, of
course, Firm B also chooses to unlawfully employ illegal alien workers at
below-market wage rates.). At a price equal to PP', while Firm A will
nonetheless realize above-normal economic profits, Firm B will not. Since
price PP' is less than Firm B’s average total costs, Firm B will only
minimize its losses at a price equal to PP'. Consequently, at price PP', Firm
B should consider exiting the market. Given the presence of fixed costs,
the firm’s average variable costs are less than its average total cost, and the
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“firm is indeed losing money.” 129
The fact that Firm A’s lowered cost structure driven by its decision to
unlawfully hire illegal alien workers at below-market rates rather than
some transient market condition suggests that Firm B will continue to
sustain losses at price PP'. Thus, there is little reason for Firm B to remain
in the market and await a new long-run equilibrium where it will again earn
normal profits on its capital investment. Firm B’s options are to either exit
the market or adopt Firm A’s unlawful conduct and thereby level the
economic playing field.
At prices PP* and PP, there is little doubt that Firm B must exit the
market. Prices PP* and PP are less than Firm B’s average variable costs (PP*
and PP < AVC). Again, Firm B has little choice but to exit the market or
adopt Firm A’s unlawful conduct of hiring illegal alien workers at belowmarket costs. 130
Firm A’s lowered but distorted input costs realized by its efforts to
unlawfully employ illegal alien workers at below-market wage rates, at a
minimum, discourage future market entry, and more realistically are likely
to constitute formidable, if not impenetrable, barriers to market entry.

129. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 259 (“The firm should therefore consider
shutting down. If it does, it earns no revenue, but it avoids the fixed as well as the variable
cost of production.”); see also HIRSCHEY, supra note 80, at 389 (“Under perfect
competition, the firm will either produce nothing and incur a loss equal to its fixed costs, or
it will produce an output determined by the intersection of the horizontal demand curve and
the marginal cost curve. If price is less than average variable costs, the firm should produce
nothing and incur a loss equal to total fixed costs. Losses will increase if any output is
produced and sold when P < AVC. If price exceeds average variable cost, then each unit of
output provides at least some profit contribution to help cover fixed costs and provide profit.
The minimum point on the firm’s average variable cost curve determines the lower limit, or
cutoff point, of its supply schedule.”); SALVATORE, supra note 93, at 331 (“Another way of
looking at this is to say that . . . the excess of [price] . . . over the firm’s average variable
cost (AVC) . . . can be applied to cover part of the firm’s fixed costs . . . . Thus, the firm
minimizes its losses by continuing to produce its best level of output.”).
130. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 43, at 259-60; see also COLANDER, supra note
40, at 259 (“The shutdown price for a perfectly competitive firm is a price below the
minimum point of the average variable cost curve.”); HIRSCHEY, supra note 80, at 390
(“Price fails to cover variable costs at price below . . . the minimum point of the AVC curve,
so this is the lowest price at which the firm will operate.”); MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note
52, at 316-17 (“A price-taking firm maximizes economic profits (or minimizes losses) in the
short run by producing the output for which marginal cost equals price unless the price is
lower than the minimum of its average variable-cost curve. In that case, the market price is
lower than the average variable cost of producing any and all levels of output, so the firm
will minimize losses by discontinuing production.”); NICHOLSON, supra note 60, at 271 (“If
price falls below minimum AVC, the firm’s profit maximizing choice is to shut down and
produce nothing.”); SALVATORE, supra note 93, at 331 (“Thus, point H is the shut-down
point of the firm. Below point H, the firm would not even cover its variable costs, and so by
going out of business, the firm would limit its losses to be equal to its total fixed costs.”).
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The Anticompetitive/Unfair Competitive Nature of an Asymmetrical
Geopolitical Landscape.

From a purely economic perspective, the unlawful act of hiring illegal
alien workers at below-market wage rates at a very minimum discourages,
if not eliminates competition. Moreover, to the extent such conduct
ultimately leads to the failure of several operational conditions necessary
for competition to thrive, such conduct results in a competitive injury to the
market place, and ultimately society.
First, such conduct threatens, jeopardizes, and/or impedes several
underlying conditions of the perfectly-competitive model. It violates the
assumption that all buyers and sellers are price–takers, giving the hiring
firm significant market power. It creates an environment of exclusion
nurtured by the creation of entry and exit barriers at both the input and
output levels of competition. It generates distorted output levels driven by
inaccurate below-market cost data. And finally, it violates the ceteris
paribus assumption to the extent that market competitors seek profitmaximization within a very unstable, asymmetrical geopolitical
infrastructure where different rules apply to different participants, due to
both the failure to adhere to statutory proscription and of the sovereignty to
enforce breaches thereof.
Second, the conduct of hiring illegal alien workers at below-market
wage rates attacks and vitiates the central nervous system of the perfectlycompetitive model, and accordingly, will likely lead to exclusion, higher
prices and curtailed output. Once a firm realizes artificial below-market
costs from its unlawful activities, there is little its competitors can do but to
either exit the market or join in the unlawful activity.
Finally, for competition to thrive, the geopolitical playing field must
be level for all participants. There is simply no pro-competitive business
justification for ignoring the geopolitical landscape upon which economic
battles are won or lost. The rules must be equally applied to all economic
combatants; otherwise, an asymmetrical application of the rules of the
competitive market place will annihilate the natural utility/profit
maximizing incentives that drive the economy.
V.

RELEVANT JURISPRUDENTIAL ECONOMICS AND ANTITRUST
PRECEDENT.

A.

Sherman Antitrust Act §1 and Unlawful Restraints in Trade.

Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act states that “[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
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declared to be illegal.” 131 Of course, common law precedent qualifies
Section 1 by explaining that only concerted activity that results in an
“unreasonable” restraint of trade is actionable under the Sherman Act. 132
Although it is a vertical agreement/combination between a firm and its
unlawful labor force that is at issue, such an agreement/combination
nonetheless constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade to the extent that
it interferes with the unfettered forces of supply and demand as it
determines an equilibrium quantity and a market clearing price. Moreover,
such an agreement/combination further constitutes an unreasonable
restraint of trade to the extent that it restrains other horizontal competitors
from entering and/or otherwise causes them to arbitrarily and hastily exit
the market. Finally, the unreasonableness of the act is certainly grounded
on its unlawfulness; its illegality is counterintuitive to notions of
reasonableness.
B.

Sherman Antitrust Act § 2, Attempts to Monopolize and Predation.

Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act states that “[e]very person who
shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with
any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony.” 133 The act of unlawfully hiring illegal alien
workers at below-market wage rates is clearly predatory; and to the extent
that it has a probability of succeeding in driving competitors out of, as well
as barring other would-be competitors from entering the market, such an
act is unlawful under Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
Although antitrust law is not usually concerned with setting a
limit on price competition, under certain conditions low prices
may have anticompetitive effects. A firm that drives out,
excludes, or disciplines rivals by selling at non-remunerative
prices is not competing on the merits, but engaging in behavior
that may properly be called predatory. Antitrust therefore
includes a “predatory pricing” offense within the proscription of

131. 15 U.S.C. §1 (2004).
132. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911) (revealing
that under this view, the purpose of the statute is not to restrain the right to make and
enforce contracts, whether resulting from combinations or otherwise, which did not unduly
restrain interstate or foreign commerce; but to protect that commerce from being restrained
by methods whether old or new, which would constitute an interference, and thus would
qualify as an undue restraint); see also Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,
127 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2007) (“[T]he Court has repeated time and again that § 1 ‘outlaws
only unreasonable restraints.’”) (quoting State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997)).
133. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2004).
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monopolization in §2 of the Sherman Act . . . . 134
If a firm (taking advantage of its distorted cost structure resulting from
its unlawful hiring activities) attempts to exclude its rivals by pricing below
the otherwise long-run, market-average total costs confronting its lawabiding rivals, it is fair to say that its behavior is predatory. 135
In many ways, the case of a firm hiring illegal alien workers at belowmarket wages and proceeding to price its product below its otherwise
would-be average total cost curve is analogous (but without the sacrifice of
short-run profits) to the predatory pricing cases reviewed in most Antitrust
textbooks. The practice of predatory pricing has been classically described
to involve
an immediate sacrifice of profits through unreasonably low
prices. These low prices destroy rivals or intimidate them from
selling at a lower price than the defendant charges. Then follows
a “recoupment” period, during which the defendant enjoys
monopoly prices or profits. In order for predatory pricing of this
variety to be rational strategy, recoupment gains, discounted to
present value, must exceed the immediate losses from the
predatory campaign. 136
Contrary to the classic predatory pricing case, profit is not sacrificed
in the short-run when a firm unlawfully hires illegal alien workers at
below-market wages and proceeds to price its product below its otherwise
would-be average total cost curve. Throughout the firm’s campaign of
predation, it has the capacity to earn above-normal economic profits. The
issue of whether the firm will likely recoup the expenses of its predatory
conduct is therefore moot. There is little or no danger of failure; rather,
there is a dangerous probability that the firm will succeed with respect to its
exclusionary intent.

134. PHILLIP E. AREEDA AND HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW
§7.03a,7-41 (3d ed. 2008).
135. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985) (“If a
firm has been ‘attempting to exclude rivals on some basis other than efficiency,’ it is fair to
characterize its behavior as predatory.” (quoting ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX
160 (1978)); see also 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 78 (1978)
(“Thus, ‘exclusionary’ comprehends at the most behavior that not only (1) tends to impair
the opportunities of rivals, but also (2) either does not further competition on the merits or
does so in an unnecessarily restrictive way.”).
136. PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 3A ANTITRUST LAW, AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 22 (3d ed. 2008).
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Per Se Unlawfulness.

The predatory conduct of unlawfully hiring illegal alien workers at
below-market wage rates is per se unlawful. The Supreme Court has
resorted to per se rules when the restraint being analyzed “would always or
almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output.” 137 For a
particular restraint or activity to justify per se treatment, the restraint or
activity must have “manifestly anticompetitive” effects 138 and “lack . . . any
redeeming virtue.” 139 The predatory act of unlawfully hiring illegal alien
workers at below-market wage rates is manifestly anticompetitive for all of
the reasons discussed above. Moreover, one is hard pressed to find any
redeeming virtue in a predatory activity, which is statutorily unlawful.
D.

Unfair Methods of Competition—The California Model.

In closing, it merits noting that the California Unfair Competition
Law 140 (which is often considered analogous to the Federal Trade
Commission Act 141 ) defines the term “unfair competition” to include “any
unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice . . . .” 142 Essentially,
under California law, any unlawful business act may constitute a method of
unfair competition.
Accordingly, any unlawful business act is
independently actionable under the California Business and Professions
Code. 143 As one California Appellate Court explained, “[t]he ‘unlawful’

137. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 127 S. Ct. at 2713 (2007) (quoting Business Elec.
Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723(1988)).
138. Id. (quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977)).
139. Id. (quoting Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co.,
472 U.S. 284, 289 (1985)).
140. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2008).
141. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 33 at 6:3 (“The UCL is
California’s ‘little FTC Act.’”).
142. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200, supra note 140 (stating “[a]s used in this chapter,
unfair competition shall mean and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or
practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by
Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 17500) of Part 3 of Division 7 of the Business and
Professions Code.”).
143. Id.; see also Rubin v. Green, 847 P.2d 1044 (Cal. 1993) (deciding UCL action
based on unlawful client solicitation); People v. McKale, 602 P.2d 731 (Cal. 1979)
(deciding UCL action based on violation of Mobilehome Park Act); Fenning v. Glenfed, 47
Cal. Rptr. 2d 715 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (deciding UCL action based on fraudulent and
negligent misrepresentations concerning federal insurance of investment products);
Saunders v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 438, 440-42 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that
unlawful business practices prohibited by § 17200 are any practices forbidden by any law,
regardless if the predicate law provides for private enforcement); Consumer Union of U. S.,
Inc. v. Fisher Dev., Inc., 257 Cal. Rptr. 151 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (deciding UCL action to
enforce Unruh Civil Rights Act).
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practices prohibited by section 17200 are any practices forbidden by law,
be it civil or criminal, federal, state or municipal, statutory, regulatory, or
court-made.” 144
For example, in the California case, Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v.
Lucky Stores, Inc., 145 a non-profit organization brought suit under
California’s Unfair Competition Law against the Defendant and numerous
other retailers in Northern California for selling cigarettes to minor children
in violation of the state’s penal code. In reversing the trial court’s order
sustaining the defendant retailer’s demurrer, the California Court of
Appeals observed that:
Approximately 90 percent of cigarette sales in northern
California are to children or to adults who were addicted as
children and who would like, but are unable, to quit smoking.
Consequently, [Defendant] has unjustly enriched itself in an
amount equal to 90 percent of its gross profits from the sale of
cigarettes. 146
In reaching its decision, the court noted that:
The UCL [Unfair Competition Law] defines “unfair competition”
as “. . . any unlawful, unfair or deceptive, untrue or misleading
advertising . . . .” As we recently explained in reviewing the
scope and purpose of the unfair competition law and its remedial
provisions, “[t]he Legislature intended this ‘sweeping language’
to include ‘anything that can properly be called a business
practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.’” 147
The broad reach of the California statute accommodates the ceteris
paribus condition of the perfectly-competitive model to the extent that it
nurtures a level playing field for all market competitors and proscribes as a
matter of law any and all disturbing influences resulting from the
engagement of an unlawful act for the purpose of gaining an advantage in
the market place. Under such a model, the unlawful act of hiring illegal
alien workers at below-market rates unequivocally constitutes an unfair
method of competition.

144. Saunders, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 441.
145. 950 P.2d 1086 (Cal. 1998).
146. Id. at 1089.
147. Id. at 1090, (citing Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 2 Cal..4th 1254, 1266 (Cal.
1992)) (internal citation omitted).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The central issue addressed by this article is whether the hiring of
illegal alien workers at below-market wage rates may constitute an unfair
trade and/or anticompetitive practice with exclusionary effects. It is
important to understand that the unfair/anticompetitive nature of the
referenced act is driven by a below-market wage rate that is often realized
because of the illegal nature of the employment relationship. Although
certainly suspect, transactions involving the employment of illegal alien
workers may not rise to the level of anticompetitive conduct if such
employment is at or above market wage rates. However, when such
employment is effectuated at below-market rates, rates regulated by state or
federal minimum wage laws, or rates that are otherwise uniquely available
in black-market circumstances, such employment practices are predatory
and have little redeeming values.
It might be suggested that the anticompetitive nature of the referenced
employment practice is a function of whether firms engaged in such
practices will likely be subjected to fines or other penalties as mandated by
U.S. immigration laws. One might argue that the extent to which a firm is
likely to face enforcement penalties due to its hiring of illegal workers,
such penalties will push the firm to raise its input costs back to competitive
market levels. Under these circumstances, it is unlikely that such
employment practices will have a high probability of success in terms of
causing any exclusionary effects. The critical question, however, is not
whether the government has enforced immigration laws by way of fine or
sanction, but whether the hiring of illegal alien workers has allowed a firm
to reduce its costs to the exclusion of its law-abiding competitors
(regardless of the government’s enforcement activities). If there is little or
no enforcement of the law prohibiting the hiring of illegal alien workers
such that a firm is willing to take the risk of hiring such workers, then the
firm’s employment practice is anticompetitive and market distorting insofar
as it results in such workers being hired at below-market wages. If it does
not lead to such workers being hired at below-market wages, then there is
no anticompetitive advantage gained by such a practice.
On the other hand, even if there is aggressive enforcement of the law
prohibiting the hiring of illegal alien workers, such enforcement does not
operate as a guarantee to remedy the anticompetitive nature of the
employment act, unless such enforcement has the effect of raising the
firm’s costs back to competitive market levels. Thus, the economic
question is whether the act of hiring illegal alien workers allows a firm to
artificially reduce its cost structure to the exclusion of the other law-abiding
firms who refuse to violate the law, regardless of existing enforcement
policies.
Additionally, given the lagged effect of any regulatory
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intervention in an otherwise failed competitive market place, such
intervention may be too little, too late; especially if the injury to the
competitive market place has already resulted in the artificially premature
exit of competitive firms.
Collateral but related issues raised by the above analysis meriting
further consideration include:
(1) Will a private cause of action under state or federal
antitrust laws for the hiring of an illegal alien worker
ultimately facilitate the enforcement of U.S.
immigration laws? If so, what are the policy
implications with respect to same? Will such private
causes of action serve the public interest from a private
attorney general perspective?
(2) Will the United States’ immigration law’s penalty and
sanction provisions merit review to the extent they
merely reference arbitrary penalty amounts? Given the
potentially anticompetitive effect resulting from a
firm’s violation of United States’ immigration law,
should Congress at least consider amending the
penalty provisions of such laws and allow for the
imposition of penalties and sanctions equal to the
anticompetitive injury inflicted on the relevant market
under examination?
(3) Does the probability of enforcement impact the
strategic games competitors play within various market
structures such as perfect competition, monopolistic
competition, oligopoly, duopoly, and/or monopoly?
(4) Will the certeris paribus assumption (or condition)
play an important role in other policy scenarios such as
constitutional notions of equal protection, deterrence
of other antisocial conduct, and/or institutional
legitimacy of public enforcement strategies?
In closing, the hiring of illegal alien workers at below-market wages
may indeed constitute an unlawful restraint of trade and/or unfair trade
practice under both state and federal law. Enforcement of the statutory
prohibitions against the hiring of illegal alien workers, whether by criminal
prosecutions under the United States immigration laws or by civil (or
criminal) prosecutions under state and federal antitrust laws, is critical to
correcting and/or minimizing the accompanying economic distortions and
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